As expected, after the Philippines won its international arbitration case against Communist China regarding the latter’s territorial claims in the West Philippine Sea, the enforcement of the judgment has become a problem. That’s because the arbitration tribunal can only resolve the case and has no power to enforce its own rulings. Moreover, Beijing unreasonably refuses to recognize the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
The communist government in Beijing seems contented with the current stalemate because the Chinese military arsenal is more powerful than those of its neighbors in South East Asia, the Philippines in particular. China has been flexing its military muscle in the disputed sea lane—an indication that Beijing has no intention of complying with the pronouncement of the arbitration panel.
Because the Philippines does not have a military force to match that of the communist giant, Manila has ruled out an armed conflict as a possible solution to the problem. Accordingly, the Philippines’ only feasible option is to engage Beijing in a peaceful and, possibly, a fruitful dialogue. That option will be futile if Manila is unable to muster enough bargaining power by the time the negotiations take place.
With the planned visit of President Rodrigo Duterte to Beijing within the year almost a certainty, the prospects of forging an equitable compromise between the two countries are encouraging because Duterte is known to be a shrewd, experienced, and practical negotiator, with the best interests of his country in mind.
To improve his chances of getting a good deal from China, President Duterte will have to figure out where Beijing’s current economic interests are focused, as well as Beijing’s vulnerable areas in the realm of international trade. Manila will score big if Duterte is able to pinpoint what Beijing currently needs from its Southeast Asian neighbors, and haggle within the framework of those needs. If his timing is right, Duterte may be able to bring home the bacon.
Fortunately, an opportunity in that direction appears to present itself in Beijing’s ongoing “Silk Road” project.
At an economic forum organized by the Asian Institute of Management last week, Zhang Yuyan, one of China’s top economists, spoke about his country’s role in global economic affairs, and revealed his government’s “Silk Road” project. He said the project was proposed by their president, Xi Jinping, back in 2013, and that the operational plans began in earnest the following year.
Zhang stated that the “Silk Road” project has two components. The first is the Silk Road Economic Belt, which intends to connect China with central Asia, Russia, the Baltic countries, the Persian Gulf and, ultimately, the Mediterranean Sea.
This component looks like a modern version of the “silk road” of olden times, an ancient trade route across the vastness of Asia which Chinese merchants took to bring silk to the Middle East and Europe.
That route will be complemented by another one, which plans to connect China with South East Asia and South Asia, and, in the end, the Indian Ocean.
The second component of the “Silk Road” project is called the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” a commercial maritime highway likewise consisting of two routes. One route expects to go from China’s coastline to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, and another one will be from the Chinese coastline to the South China Sea, and then on to the South Pacific.
Beijing has another name for this ambitious undertaking – the Belt and Road project.
Zyang said that in various ways, many countries are already involved in the Belt and Road project as seen in the existing deals his government has inked with other governments. These deals cover many concerns ranging from railway construction to nuclear energy. He added that many Chinese business corporations have already invested about 42 billion US dollars in the project, which is about a quarter of the total capital outlay.
In addition, Zyang predicted that the Belt and Road project will increase interaction among the countries covered by the project through overland roads, railways, and sea lanes. Analysts opine that a heavily populated sea lane will discourage piracy in the Gulf of Thailand.
Although Zyang expressed optimism about the stability of his nation’s economy in the predictable future, he acknowledged that there are risks and uncertainties in the undertaking, such as sharp fluctuations in currencies and interest rates, bad corporate debts, and a glut in the real estate market.
Owing to the tense situation in the West Philippine Sea brought about by the maritime dispute between Manila and Beijing, Zhang insisted that Beijing has no hidden agenda in the Belt and Road project.
If that is so, then the Belt and Road project, the maritime silk road component in particular, may be the ace which President Duterte can use at the bargaining table when he talks to the Chinese. That’s because the success of the maritime silk road project will depend very much on the political stability in the coastal territory of mainland China. That political stability, in turn, is premised on a peaceful resolution of, among others, the maritime dispute between Manila and Beijing.
Since tensions between nations discourage trade, and considering that the Chinese have already invested so much in the project, it will be in the best interest of China to resolve its maritime dispute with the Philippines as quickly as possible. Considering that the Belt and Road project is a long-range plan, any delay is bad for China.
If and when President Duterte does engage Chinese leaders in a dialogue in the near future, mapping out the parameters of the cooperation Manila will be willing to extend to Beijing in the Belt and Road project may be the best means of forcing Beijing to rethink its reculcitrant attitude on the Philippine victory in the international arbitration case involving what is arguably one of the most important sealanes in the world.