Allegedly libelous social media posts are only punishable under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, the Supreme Court has ruled.
In an 18-page decision promulgated on April 26 but only released Tuesday, the SC Second Division granted a petition for review filed by Jaannece Peñalosa and reinstated the dismissal of the libel case filed against her.
“[A]n allegedly libelous Facebook post made may only be punishable under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, not under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code,” the Court said.
The case stemmed from Peñalosa’s petition assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) decision, which reversed the order of a trial court that dismissed her libel case.
The CA held that her supposedly libelous Facebook post — made in 2011 before the enactment of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 — is punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
According to the SC, the appellate court interpreted Section(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act to mean that the libel provision under the Revised Penal Code covers libelous internet or Facebook posts.
However, the Supreme Court said that “similar means” under Article 355 of the RPC did not include “online defamation.”
The SC said that associate words include “writing,” “printing,” “lithography,” “engraving,” “radio,” “phonograph,” “painting,” “theatrical exhibition,” and “cinematographic exhibition,” and excluded “computer systems or other similar means which may be derived in the future” that was added in the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
“If it were true that Article 355 of the RPC already includes libel made through computer systems, then Congress had no need to legislate Article 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act, for the latter legal provision will be superfluous,” the Court said.
“To make cyber libel punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code is to make a penal law effective retroactively but unfavorably to the accused,” it later added.
Meanwhile, the High Court said the trial court also did not gravely abuse its discretion in granting the prosecution’s motion to withdraw the information.
“All told, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge (Rizalina) Capco-Umali in dismissing the criminal case for libel against the petitioner,” it said.
“With the withdrawal of the information and the consequent dismissal of the criminal case he had filed, the respondent cannot insist on the criminal prosecution of the petitioner. He, however, still has the remedy of a civil action for damages should he opt to file one,” it added.