As I wrote in my last column, the Marrakech climate change conference ended well with the adoption of the Marrakech Action Proclamation for our Climate and Sustainable Development. The document reflects the strong political will of the international community to move aggressively on climate change, notwithstanding the election of Donald Trump in the United States. We were represented well by a strong delegation headed by Secretary Gina Lopez, Undersecretary Gloria Mercado, Assistant Secretary Evelyn Cruzada, Climate Change Commissioner Vernice Victorio, Undersecretary Jess Posadas, and Urban Poor Commission Chair Terry Ridon, assisted ably by diplomats, lawyers, technical experts, and advisers from government agencies and civil society.
For the Philippines, there are several tasks to do after Marrakech. We need to ratify the Paris Agreement. We also need to rethink our international alliances on climate change. And finally, we need to fix our climate governance.
We must ratify the Paris Agreement quickly so we can share in the early opportunities for climate finance and other support already available for climate change mitigation and adaptation. We must, however, accompany ratification with a declaration that the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution—a commitment to reduce, subject to availability of support, by 2030 our emissions by 70 percent of business as usual emissions (what it would otherwise have been if we did not take action)—we submitted in Paris is not yet final. We need a bottom up process where government departments will submit their contributions to the mitigation commitment based on their respective capabilities. That should give comfort to the Department of Energy, which is resisting ratification. Its first order of priority is sustainable and affordable energy access for all.
To move forward on energy access, as I have co-authored in a report published recently by the Ateneo School of Government, an optimal energy mix policy is essential. Considering the Philippines’ growth objectives, the government’s mandate to establish an energy mix that addresses the trilemma (security, equity, and environmental sustainability), and the current energy mix dominated by coal, the government must prioritize diversification.
To optimize the coal share in the energy mix, the government must set a cap on coal plant endorsements using a portfolio-based approach. This can be done by limiting the endorsements of new coal plants to the projected baseload demand of each region, taking into account the changing needs of the economy. It is also urgent to create a gold standard for coal plants, which would be in the form of (1) performance guards because as coal plants age they become more inefficient and thus more expensive, and (2) strict implementation of the Clean Air Act. For new plants, the gold standard can be a policy that only ultra-supercritical plants can be built. Eventually as we have agreed in the Climate Vulnerable Forum, we must aim for 100 percent renewable energy. We must move in that direction while ensuring affordable energy for our economic development and societal needs.
On the international side, we should rejoin the Like Minded Developing Countries bloc (we were co-founders but we left in 2014). While keeping our ties with the Climate Vulnerable Forum and with developed country partners like the European Union and the United States (assuming it stays in the Paris Agreement), a pivot back to LMDC offers the best negotiating leverage for the Philippines. Not the least of the reasons for doing this is that China is a member of the LMDC and it looks like it would soon be the sole global leader on climate change. Likewise, India, another LMDC member, is positioned well on this issue.
China is widely expected to overtake the US as the world’s biggest economy by 2026 in nominal GDP terms and remain so at least until 2050. India, on the other hand, is projected to be the 3rd largest economy after China and the US by 2050. Clearly, greater economic and political engagement by the Philippines with the Asian powers could trigger downstream economic and political benefits for us.
This is reinforced by the fact that we sharing many climate vulnerability and economic development characteristics with these countries.
China’s future economic growth model—crafted through its five-year plans—is now centered on pursuing a lower-emissions growth path, premised on an increasing share of renewable energy in its national energy mix and in slowly drawing down on coal, in response to domestic concerns over air pollution from coal plants and industrial factories. This means that domestic investments into energy research and development and infrastructure are prioritizing renewable energy, with the result that by 2030, China’s energy will be majority renewable energy rather than fossil fuels.
In 2015 China became the world’s largest producer of photovoltaic power, at 43 GW installed capacity. China also leads the world in the production and use of wind power and smart grid technologies, generating almost as much water, wind, and solar energy as all of France and Germany’s power plants combined. This will corollarily mean that China’s R&D on clean energy technology will most likely see it rapidly outpace and become the leader in such clean energy technology production. For the Philippines, being able to tap into this growing powerhouse of RE technology and developing technology partnership and cooperation initiatives could become beneficial in also triggering a rapid shift by the Philippines away from coal into RE technology for its energy, industrial, and transport grids.
Working with China and India in the climate change negotiations is also strategically correct for the Philippines. Both countries have become a strong voice in pushing for substantial climate change action, and a major pillar for developing countries in the climate change negotiations in asserting the convention principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and equity.
Rejoining the LMDC is also consistent with President Duterte’s demand on developed countries to recognize their historical responsibility for climate change. With the LMDC and the Group of 77 and China, we are already insisting that developed countries providing finance and technology transfer to developing countries implementing climate actions.
Finally, all our policies and plans to address climate change will be for naught if our climate governance institutions are not working properly. Unfortunately, six years after its creation, the Climate Change Commission continues to struggle in becoming an effective vehicle for climate action. It pains me to say that we have had, since 2009, a dysfunctional commission, caused more by structural problems and not mainly because of the personalities of the six commissioners that have been appointed so far.
Whether the President decides to keep the current leadership and set of commissioners or replace them totally or partially with a new, more cohesive group of his own appointees, the CCC must become a collegial body (every decision, from negotiation positions to all staff and contractual appointments, must be approved by all three commissioners) and reach out to collaborate and not compete or clash with other departments. As long as there is disunity within the commission, it will not be able to accomplish much.
There is hope for climate change. But we must get our act together.
Facebook: deantonylavs Twitter: tonylavs