“Examples of direct contempt are using scurrilous language in the presence of the judge, offensive behaviors towards the opposing counsel or party in court, refusal to be sworn in or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so”
Contempt is an act or omission tending to obstruct or interfere with the orderly administration of justice, or to impair the dignity of the court or respect for its authority (Barron’s Legal Dictionary).
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and need not be specifically granted by statute (Lorenzo Shipping v. Distribution Association Management of the Philippines, G.R. 155849, August 31, 2011).
The exercise of the power to punish contempt has twofold aspects, namely: (1) the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect towards the court or its orders; and (2) the compulsion of the performance of some act or duty required of him by the court which he refuses to perform (The Philippine Railways v. Paredes, et al., G.R. L-44983, March 31, 1936).
Recapitulating the twofold aspects of the exercise of the power of contempt, contempt is classified as civil or criminal.
Criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court and may occur in either criminal or civil actions and special proceedings (G.R. L-44983, March 31, 1936).
On the other hand, civil contempt consists of failing to do something ordered to be done by a court for the benefit of the opposing party in a civil action, and is, therefore, not an offense against the dignity of the court, but against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made (G.R. L-44983, March 31, 1936).
“It is at times difficult to determine whether the proceedings are civil or criminal. In general, the character of the contempt… is determined by the nature of the contempt involved, regardless of the cause… and… the relief sought… The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial” (G.R. 155849, August 31, 2011).
Under the provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure, “[C]ontempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court” (G.R. 155849, August 31, 2011).
The punishment for the first (direct contempt) is generally summary and immediate, and no process or evidence is necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae.
“The inherent power of courts to punish contempt of court committed in the presence of the courts without further proof of facts and without aid of a trial is not open to question…” (G.R. 155849, August 31, 2011).
Examples of direct contempt are using scurrilous language in the presence of the judge, offensive behaviors towards the opposing counsel or party in court, refusal to be sworn in or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so (see Rule 71, Section 1, Rules of Civil Procedure).
In the case of Cruz v. Gingoyon, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Ferdinand Cruz (Cruz) alleging that Judge Gingoyon has been communicating with the defendant off the record. When asked to adduce proof of the allegation, Cruz was not able to give any, but repeatedly argued that it is his “fair observation or conclusion” (G.R. 170404, September 28, 2011).
“The act of [Cruz] in openly accusing Judge Gingoyon of communicating with the defendant off the record, without factual basis, brings the court into disrepute. The accusation… is derogatory, offensive, and malicious. The accusation taints the credibility and the dignity of the court and questions its impartiality” (G.R. 170404, September 28, 2011).
“[C]ontemptuous statements made in pleadings… constitute direct contempt. [A] pleading… containing derogatory, offensive, or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending… has been held to be equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge…” (G.R. 170404, September 28, 2011).
“In contrast, the second [indirect contempt] usually requires proceedings less summary than the first. The proceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act committed outside the personal knowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed” (G.R. 155849, August 31, 2011).
In the case of Britania v. Gepty, et al., the judgment obligor failed to appear in a motion hearing pursuant to Rule 39, Section 36 that allows the examination of the judgment obligor when the judgment remains unsatisfied. For this reason, Britania moved to hold Panganiban (judgment obligor) in indirect contempt of court (G.R. No. 246995, January 22, 2020).
“[I]ndirect contempt is only punished after a written petition is filed and an opportunity to be heard is given to the party charged. Verily, the trial court here should have dismissed [outright] petitioner’s [Britania] oral charge of indirect contempt for not being compliant with Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court” (G.R. 246995, January 22, 2020).
In another case, Hansel M. Marantan and other co-accuseds were charged with homicide, with the case being under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
It involved the alleged killing of Anton Cu-Unjieng, Francis Xavier Manzano, and Brian Anthony Dulay by the accused police officers in front of the AIC Gold Tower at Ortigas Center which was captured by a television crew from UNTV 37 (Marantan v. Diokno, et al., G.R. 205956, February 12, 2014).
Marantan claims that during an interview on TV Patrol with the victims’ relatives together with their lawyer, they allegedly made comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings which tended to prejudge the guilt of the accused, to influence the court or to obstruct the administration of justice (G.R. 205956, February 12, 2014).
To Marantan the public comments violate the sub judice rule which may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. However, the Supreme Court held that “the comments seem to be… an expression of their [relatives] opinion that their loved ones were murdered by Marantan” (G.R. No. 205956, February 12, 2014).
“This is merely a reiteration of their position in [the criminal case] which precisely calls the Court to upgrade the charges from homicide to murder. The Court detects no malice on the face of the said statements. The mere restatement of their argument in their petition cannot actually, or does not even tend to, influence the Court” (G.R. 205956, February 12, 2014).